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Enforcement Mechanisms for International
Standards of Judicial Independence: The
Role of Government and Private Actors
Rachel Stopchinski*
ABSTRACT
In 2017, the prevailing political party in Poland, Law and Justice
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwos6), proposed a series of radical legislative
changes designed to strip the Polish judiciary of its independence.
Though the European Union (EU) has extensively investigated this
egregious attack on the rule of law, no concrete steps have been taken to
impose sanctums on, or otherwise discipline, the Polish government for
defying EU ideals. Despite the fundamental importance of judicial
independence in maintaining the rule of law, there are presently no
widely adopted international standards of judicial independence.
Therefore, no guidelines are promulgated for governments to follow, and
no well-executed path of action exits to shepherd wayward countries back
into compliance. Something must be done. This paper seeks to explore the
history behind the current judicial crisis in Poland, the possibility of
implementing concrete international standards of judicial independence,
and the feasibility of enforcement mechanisms driven by private actors.

* J.D Candidate, 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; B.A.,
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INTRODUCTION

While judicial independence 1 is fundamental to effective,
democratic governance,2 it is not always guaranteed within countries'
constitutional framework. 3 Thus, there have been several movements to
formulate and adopt international standards for judicial independence,
such as the ABA's Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI)4 and the Central
Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI). 5 These movements, though
effective in communicating the importance of protecting judicial
independence internationally, 6 have not led to a formally adhered to or
enforced set of standards for judicial independence.
1. Judicial independence, fur the purposes of this paper, will be defined as
independence of the judiciary from undue influence from political actors and other
branches of government. Essential to this concept is the judiciary's ability to make
reasoned judgments based on their interpretation of the law, rather than based on the
ideology of the dominant political party. See generally Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial
Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood, 15 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129 (2006)
(exploring the definition of "judicial independence" and emphasizing the importance of
"the judiciary's independence from the executive" and the facilitation of "judicial
discretion" as an "explicit part of the judicial decision-making process").
2. See Shimon Shetreet, The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in

Domestic and Internatwnal Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International
Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L.

275, 277 (2009) ("Principles of independence in the judiciary are essential for ensuring the
rule of law, protecting human rights, and securing the continued preservation and
development of democratic societies.").
3. See Markus B. Zimmer, Judicial Independence in Central and East Europe: The
Institutional Context, 14 TULSA J. CoMP. & lNT'L L. 53, 58-59 (2006) (discussing the
multifaceted elements both in and beyond constitutional language needed to ensure
judicial independence).
4. See What We Do, Governance and Justice System Strengthening, AMERICAN BAR
AssOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/what-we-do/governance
justice-system-strengthening.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing how the ABA
ROLi promotes independence in judicial systems through its judicial reform programs).
5. See CEELI INSTITUTE, JUDICIAL MANuAL ON INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY AND
INTEGRITY OF JUSTICE 5 (2018) http://ceeliinstitute.org/judicial-manual/ (describing
CEELI's efforts to assemble "all relevant international standards which establish and
clarify the principle of judicial independence in the administration of justice"); see
generally Jacques DeLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 10 U. PA. J.
lNT'L. ECON. L. 179, 188 (1999) (placing the judicial reform efforts of CEELI in the broader
context of American international legal initiatives and describing its initiatives in detail).
6. See James R. Sikenat, The American Bar Association and the Rule of Law, 67 SMU
L. REV. 745 (2014) (depicting the success of ABA efforts to promote American ideals of the
rule of law internationally, especially through CEELI and related efforts); see generally
DeLisle, supra note 5 (providing a favorable depiction of CEELI initiatives).
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This lack of enforced standards plays a role in government and
economic instability. 7 Threats to judicial independence, perhaps by
political parties attempting to seize control over the rule of law (as will
be discussed later), lead to broader economic instability. 8 International
private parties, such as corporations, rely on stable governments to
adjudicate their disputes. 9 So, when judicial independence in a
particular country is threatened, the economic health and development
suffers as private actors are not apt to invest their business in countries
where legislation and court judgments are either unpredictable or
increasingly issued against them. 10
The detrimental effects can be seen in countries such as Poland. In
2017, the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, or PiS) party, the
dominant party in Poland, proposed a series of legislative changes
designed to strip the judiciary of its independence, limit judicial
discretion, and place more control over the rule of law in the hands of
the executive and legislative branches. 11 A number of these proposals
were signed into law by the Polish parliament, while the president
vetoed others largely because of mass protest by Polish citizens. 12 Th�
passed legislation sets the terms of sitting district court judges to a fixed
length of four years; the Minister of Justice is afforded the power to
appoint and dismiss judges without sufficient review from the National
Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), "the constitutional body responsible for
safeguarding the independence of the court and judges in Poland." 13
7. See generally Emma Phillips, The War on Civil Law? The Common Law as a Proxy
for the Global Ambition of Law and Economics, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 915, 929 (2007)

(explaining that in democratic society, "independent and impartial judiciaries contribute
to the equitable and stable balance of power within the government" and vitally important
to growth of developing countries); Daniel M. Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial
Independence, and Economic Development, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GWBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J.
427, 433-34 (2007) (describing the correlation between judicial independence and
increases in stock prices and equity value).
8. Phillips, supra note 7, at 929 ("[Independent and impartial judiciaries] resolve
commercial disputes in a predictable and transparent fashion that encourages fair
competition and economic growth.").
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Michal Bilewicz, Poland's Ruling Party Tried a Judicial Power Grab-and
Then Saw It Backfire. Here's Why., THE WASIDNGTON POST (July 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/201 7/07/31/polands-ruling-party
tried-a-judicial-power-grab-and-then-saw-it-backfire-heres
why/?utm_term=.e2e00db0125d (detailing recent judicial reform measures under the PiS
political party).
12. Id.
13. See Poland: Independence of the Judiciary and the Right to Fair Trial at Risk,
AMNESTY INT'L (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:41 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latestJnews/2017/08/
poland-independence-of-the-judiciary-and-the-right-to-fair-trial-a t-risk/ (discussing "the

676

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIF5 26:2

These proposals threaten Polish judicial independence in several
ways. The new judicial appointment structure wears away at the
separation of powers in Poland by placing most decision-making about
judicial ideology on an official that is highly susceptible to political
influence. 14 Judges are forced to consider the political ideology of the
Minister of Justice when making their judgements out of fear of
dismissal. 15 Therefore, the politically influenced Minister of Justice is
afforded nearly unabated control over the shaping of the Polish rule of
law.16
Time will tell what consequences the threats to Polish judicial
independence will have on the health of the Polish government and
economy. Governing bodies such as the European Union (EU), however,
have begun to threaten to invoke its Article 7 sanctions proceedings
(restricting Poland's EU voting rights) if Poland does not change its
course for fear of its effects on the larger European community. 17 Other
more informal enforcement mechanisms that private actors enact may
prove more effective than these sanctions, particularly those that
involve economic incentives or punishment. 18 Thus, private actors,
rather than governmental bodies, could be more apt to instigate the
enforcement of standards of judicial independence. 19
Using Poland as a case study, this paper seeks to explore effective
means of preventing threats to judicial independence and remedying
deviations from acceptable standards of judicial independence. Further,
the paper will investigate the utilization of private actors' actions as
regulators of judicial independence in contrast with sanctions and other
range of measures the Polish government is taking or attempting to take to 'reform' the
judiciary in Poland" and the impact on the functions of Polish government). Although this
is not to say that the NCJ forfeits all right to veto under the new, passed legislation. The
NCJ retains the right to veto dismissal of judges, but the standards are heightened to a
two-thirds majority vote. Thus, the veto power remains, but the ability of the NCJ to veto
is significantly hindered, leaving most of the power in the hands of the Minister of Justice,
as the NCJ must reach a firm consensus to invoke their right to disagree with the
Minister of Justice's decisions.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16.

Id.

17. See Heather Grabbe & Stefan Lehne, Defending EU Values in Poland and
Hungary, CARNEGIE EUROPE (Sept. 4, 2017), http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/09/04/
defending-eu-values-in-poland-and-hungary-pub-72988 (detailing action being taken by
the EU to curb Polish judicial reform).
18. See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1589
(2011) (detailing the ways that private actors utilize economic "retaliation, reward,
reputational adjustment, and norm internalization" to enforce compliance with
international law in conjunction with formal sanctions from state actors).
19. See id. at 1574.
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methods employed by governmental bodies, such as the European
Union. Part I will place the conflict in Poland within a historical context
of economic-driven judicial reform and international promulgation of
judicial independence. Part II will investigate and determine the
efficacy of actions taken by government and private actors to influence
the stability of the rule of law and protection of judicial independence in
the European Union. Lastly, Part III will propose a framework for an
enforcement mechanism for judicial independence standards involving
the cooperation of both intergovernmental and private actors.

I.

POI.JSR JUDICIAL REFORM, THE POST-SOVIET ERA ECONOMIC
TRANSITION, AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE

Protections for judicial independence were absent when Poland was
under the domain of the Soviet Union.20 Poland emerged in its
independence from the Soviet Union "devoid of any normative and
institutional foundation of an independent judiciary." 21 Since then,
there has been significant judicial reform, partly driven by its transition
to a market-based economy.22 Despite several judicial reform initiatives
in central Europe, there are still concerns about threats to judicial
independence in Poland. 23 Thus, there is reason to believe that the
adoption of more concrete international standards of judicial
independence would increase adherence to EU law and policy by
member states.
For many reasons, judicial independence was not feasible within the
socialist-style governance present in Soviet-era Poland. Primarily, there
was an absence of separation of powers, a weak judicial structure, and
an overly powerful and politicized legislative branch that held total
responsibility for maintaining constitutionalism. 24 There was no judicial
review process, which neither afforded the judiciary any method of
assessing the actions of the executive and legislative branches nor the
independence or discretion to adjudicate disputes without undue
20. See Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Toward an Interpretive Model of Judicial Independence:
A Case Study of Eastern Europe, 31 PA. J. INT'L. L. 203, 209 (2009).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 215.
23. See OPEN Soc'Y INST., Judicial Independence in Poland, in MONITORING THE EU

ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 306, 310 (2001) (discussing ongoing
concerns about judicial independence in Poland).
24. See Koslosky, supra note 20, at 210-11; see also Ewa Letowska, Courts and
Tribunals Under the Constitution of Poland, 1997 ST. Loms-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J.
69, 69 -70 (1997) (giving a historical perspective of the Polish Constitution and noting the
lack ofjudicial review of constitutional decision under the 1952 communist constitution).
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political influence. 25 Judges were afforded little autonomy and "were
required to strictly adhere to standard interpretations of the law[;]" all
judicial opinions were vetted by the reigning political party before being
rendered. 26
Under this system where the government rendered the judiciary
powerless, judicial independence was an impossibility. 27 The judicial
branch was stripped of its legitimacy and served no purpose aside from
issuing court judgments in the Communist Party's interests. 28 All of the
hallmarks of a modern, properly functioning judiciary simply were not
present, and thus, countries like post-Soviet Poland entered democratic
governance without the means to properly ensure judicial
independence. 29 Thus, drastic reforms to the judiciary were needed in
the post-Soviet government transition.
Judicial reform in this era can be partly explained by the economic
transition from socialist property law to a market-based system of
private property. 30 Private property ownership created a variety of
concerns that could be best regulated through a stronger judiciary since
"the inadequate protection of property rights leads to lower investment
rates and slower economic growth." 31 So while the legislature could
enact laws to minimize economic disputes, ultimately the judiciary
became necessary to ensure the enforcement of enacted legislation
without fear that their decisions would bring about negative
consequences. 32 Further, when passed legislation is vague, the
judiciary's role in private property regimes is to ensure the rights of
property owners are respected. 33 An effective market-based economy,
therefore, often relies on a healthy balance between the legislature's
actions and regulation mechanisms by the judiciary who interprets,

25. Koslosky, supra note 20, at 211 ("Judicial independence of course presupposes the
presence of judicial review. The independence and objectivity of a judge as an adjudicator
of disputes is meaningless if he does not have the power to review [the constitutionality of
executive and legislative action].").
26. Id. at 211.
27. Id. at 212.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 215.
31. Id.
32. See Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judici,al Independence:
Cross-County Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 499
(2003) (discussing the way that judicial independence allows the judiciary to adjudicate
disputes between various parties without facing negative consequences).
33. See id. at 497-98 (depicting the way that market economies and rational politicians
need judicial independence because it ensures that legislation regarding property rights is
actually honored).
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shapes, and enforces the law. 34
In theory, Poland made great strides to reform its judiciary, but
until a new constitution was passed in 1997, Poland continued to
function under its 1952 Communist Constitution, which left the
judiciary's role limited. 35 The 1997 Constitution opened a new era of
judicial reform and activity, but Poland still struggles to maintain
judicial independence today. In a 2001 report regarding the EU
accession process and the state of judicial independence in newly
acquiesced member states, Poland was described as having "made
considerable progress" but still having "significant areas of concern." 36
Among these were concerns that the Minister of Justice, a member of
the executive branch, retained "considerable administrative and
supervisory authority over the organization and affairs of the
judiciary." 37 Further, the report cited concerns over the executive's
control of the judicial budget, the amount compensation for judges, and
judicial tenure. 38 These ongoing concerns are at odds with EU law and
recommendations for judicial independence.
The European Union has codified standards of judicial
independence in a few different conventions and charters, but the
majority are framed in terms of the universal human right to due
process and a fair trial. 39 Primarily, existing EU law on this topic is
found in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

34. See generally id. (providing a survey of experts in seventy-one countries showing
that judicial independence positively impacts the GDP growth per capita in a sample of
fifty-seven countries); Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and
Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325 (2000) (noting the importance
of judicial reform in transition economies and through data analysis arriving at the
conclusion that reform centered on "legal effectiveness" has the greatest impact on the
health of the economy); Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence, Liberty, Democracy and
International Economy, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: RULE OF LAW AND
WORLD PEACE 14, 14 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 2004) ("It is generally accepted that judicial
independence is a central foundation for democracy, liberty, and orderly economy.");
Emma Phillips, supra note 7, at 929 ("[R]obust judiciary is essential to ensure that rules
are applied fairly and impartially and that they develop appropriately over time.").
35. See Ewa Letowska, Courts and Tribunals Under the Constitution of Poland, 1997
ST.Lours-WARSAW TRANSATLANTICL.J. 69, 69 (1997).
36. OPEN S oc'y I NST., Judicial Independence in Poland, in MONITORING THE EU
ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 306, 310 (2001).
37. Id. at 313.
38. Id. at 310-11.
39. See Shimon Shetreet, General Introduction, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: RULE OF LAW AND WORLD PEACE 6 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 2004)
("International law influences domestic law by virtue of international human rights
treaties, which provide for principles of fair procedures and for the right to be tried before
an impartial and independent tribunal.").
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and Fundamental Freedoms40 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union.41 The premise of the EU promulgation of
judicial independence and the rule of law is to "constrai[n] the State"
where the state does not constrain itself and pay "straightforward
attention to public officials." 42 The flaw in these codified standards is
that though they outline the ideology the European Union hopes to
protect, they do not outline actionable ways in which member states can
ensure that judicial independence is maintained. 43 For a country like
Poland, the vagueness of the law mandating an independent judiciary
may allow for non-compliance while a more specific set of judicial
independence standards might not. 44
Scholars have outlined some of the essential elements of judicial
independence as: "(1) fixed tenure that offers protection from arbitrary
removal and that is subject only to narrowly tailored provisions allowing
discipline or removal of judges for misconduct or incapacity; (2) fixed
and adequate compensation; (3) minimum qualifications; and (4) limited
civil immunity for judicial decisions."45 Using these essential elements,
several international NGO's have sought to create more concrete
frameworks for organizing judicial branches and separation of powers to
facilitate higher levels of judicial independence.
One of the foremost organizations is the International Association of
Judicial Independence and World Peace which, in 2008, drafted the

40. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 14, art. 6, June 1, 2010, CETS no.194.
41. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
20.
42. DANIELA PIANA, European Standards of Judicial Governance, in JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITIES IN NEW EUROPE: FROM RULE OF LAW TO QUALITY OF JUSTICE 49, 51
(Ralf Rogowski ed., 2010).
43. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 40, at 9 ("(E]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."); see also
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 41, at 20 ("Everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal previously established by law.").
44. &e Dimitry Kochenov & Laurent Pech, Uplwlding the Rule of Law in the EU: On
the Commission's 'Pre-Article 7 Procedure' as a Timid Step in the Right Direction 4
(European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global
Governance
Programme,
EUI
Working
Paper
RSCAS
No.
24,
2015),
http://cadmus.euieu/bitstream/handle/l814/35437/RSCAS_20l5_24.pdf?sequence=3
(discussing the difficulty in enforcing provisions in the Treaty on European union which
express "open-ended" values).
45. Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of Judicial Independence and the
Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MA.RY BILL RTS. J. 1, 5 (1996).
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Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence. 46
These standards were drafted to acknowledge the judiciary's role in the
"protection of human rights and in the operation of an efficient and fair
market economy with a human face in the era of globalization." 47 This
thirty-seven-page document comprehensively depicts the building and
maintaining of a culture of judicial independence both nationally and
internationally.48 In these standards, the culture of judicial
independence is reliant on five factors: (1) "creating institutional
structure;" (2) "establishing constitutional infrastructures;" (3)
"introducing legislative provisions and constitutional safeguards;" (4)
"creating adjudicative arrangements and jurisprudence;" and (5)
"maintaining ethical traditions and code of judicial conduct." 49 Under
this methodology, the standards outline concrete ways in which to
guarantee judicial independence, such as vesting the removal of a judge
in a judicial tribunal rather than in the executive50 and ensuring that
adequacy of judicial salaries and pensions are adequate and fixed by
law.51
The Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial
Independence are highly valued and have been incorporated into other
NGO's efforts to promulgate standards of judicial independence, such as
the CEELI. CEELI is a part of the American Bar Association's (ABA)
broader ROLi and focuses on "protect[ing] fundamental rights and
individual liberties [and] promot[ing] transparent incorruptible,
accountable
governments[.]" 52
CEELI's
Judicial
Manual
on
Independence, Impartiality, and Integrity of Justice, published in
August 2017, provides a thematic compilation referencing over one
hundred different international standards and is designed to act as "an
easy-to-use reference tool to facilitate day-to-day work of judges[.]" 53,
This manual adopts many of the Mount Scopus International Standards
of Judicial Independence's principles as to creating a culture of judicial
46. See generally INT'L Ass'N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD PEACE, MOUNT SCOPUS
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 1 (2008), https://www.jiwp.org/mt-scopus
standards-2007-curre#!mt-scopus-standards/c14de.
47. Id. at 2. See also Shetreet, supra note 2, at 276 ("The development of the Mt.
Scopus Standards was necessitated by the absence of a modern, thorough revision of
standards for both national and international judges.").
48. INT'L Ass'N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD PEACE, supra note 46, at 3.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Mission of the CEELI Institute, CEELI INSTITUTE, http://ceeliinstitute.org/who-we
are/mission/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
53. CEELI INSTITUTE, supra note 5, at 5 (2017), http://ceeliinstitute.org/wp
contentluploads/2015/07/NewCover ManualJustice_AUG_l7.pdf.
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independence.54
Standards for judicial independence provide governments with
actionable ways to protect judicial independence. Rather than asserting
vague ideology-such as the need to protect the right to a fair trial-the
Mount Scopus and CEELI standards focus on ways that governments
can better organize themselves. These standards focus on developing
government structures with a more robust separation of powers by
outlining the roles the executive, legislature, and the judiciary play in
maintaining judicial independence. So while the standards may make
some broad statements, such as "the judiciary as a whole shall be
independent," 55 these statements are paired with concrete objectives,
such as "the power to discipline or remove a judge must be vested in an
institution independent of the Executive" 56 or "legislation introducing
changes to the terms of conditions of judicial services shall not be
applied to judges holding office at the time of the passing the legislation
unless the changes improve the terms of service and are generally
applied."57 By specifically outlining the nature of the relationship
between the branches of government needed to facilitate judicial
independence, these standards better equip governments with the
means to effectively promote judicial independence in their own
organizational structure.
Thus, standards focused on more actionable objectives make it
abundantly clear what is and is not permitted. Under these models,
deviations from standards are more easily identified, and therefore,
member countries will be more aware what the European Union would
not find acceptable. From a practicality standpoint, there is a benefit to
imposing uniformity on countries within an intergovernmental
organization like the European Union. While these standards lack
flexibility,58 if the European Union maintains its commitment to
advancing the rule of law in central and eastern Europe, adopting more
concrete standards such as these would assert their viewpoint on
judicial independence. Assuming that a core aspect of good governance
is establishing law that provides for predictable outcomes, 59 establishing
54. Id. at 14.
55. INT'L Ass'N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD PEACE, supra note 46, at 6.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 11.
58. These standards are less flexible in the sense that adopting them would prescribe
specific judicial branch organization onto member states, whereas more broad standards
for judicial independence afford member states more freedom in the structuring of their
individual governments.
59. See David Boies, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL. 57, 57 (2006) (describing how a key aspect of the "rule of law" proves that "the rule
applied to a particular case must be reasonably predictable"); see generally Phillips, supra
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more explicit guidelines could encourage countries to remain compliant
preemptively rather than pushing the boundaries to discover what is
and is not acceptable.

II. The Efficacy of Intergovernmental and Private Actors in Enforcing
International Standards of Judicial Independence
As evidenced through the case of Poland, both private, economic
interests and the needs of intergovernmental organizations like the
European Union can drive judicial reform. Despite this oversight, due to
the lack of concrete standards of judicial independence, states may still
deviate from accepted protections of the independent judiciary. When a
state launches threats against judicial independence, private actors may
play a more effective role in encouraging compliance than
intergovernmental organizations. While the European Union can
impose sanctions on non-compliant member states, these sanctions may
not prove as convincing or as timely as direct economic consequences by
private actors for failure of a country to maintain judicial independence.

The Role of the European Union
Membership in the European Union is highly valued by member
states due to the many benefits conferred from affiliation with a larger
organization of states. 60 The European Union thus has an incentive in
ensuring that member states comply with its ideals and maintain
certain standards of democracy and fair governance. 61 The European

note 7, at 928 ("Good governance requires a known set of rules that are enforced, effective
mechanisms to ensure the legitimate application of these rules, and an independent third
party to resolve disputes in their application").
60. See About the EU: Poland, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european
union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/poland_en Qast visited Feb. 13, 2019)
(describing, for example, Poland's involvement in the EU including how, in 2015, total EU
spending in Poland reached € 13.258); see also Remi Adekoya, How the EU Transformed
Poland, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2014, 11:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/may/01/eu-poland-10-years-economic (illustrating the vast economic
and social benefit Poland has received from its participation in the European Union); see
generally Phillips, supra note 7, at 927(describing how "much-coveted membership in the
European Union" drives judicial reform, especially the maintenance of judicial
independence in Poland).
61. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Preamble, Dec. 13,
2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 (stating that the Union is founded on the "principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law"
principles which are common to the Member States); id. art. 3 (regarding the EU's
commitment to advancing its values, the treaty assets that a member state "[i]n its
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Union has maintained a long-term commitment to the promulgation of
judicial independence62 and holds expectations of judicial independence
for its member states. 63 Inherent in judicial independence is the idea
that the public has access to its fair day in court where court jud gments
are not made on the basis of government and political influence but
instead on the judge's own interpretation of the law and facts. 64 As
discussed earlier, EU law mandates that member states must maintain
independent judiciaries; so when judicial independence is threatened,
this violates both EU ideals and laws, and the European Union must act
to bring deviating states back into compliance.
The European Union's primary sanction that it could use against a
non-compliant state is Article 7, which is intended to be used when EU
member countries commit human rights violations. 65 Article 7 was first
created through the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam 66 (as an amendment to
the previously adopted Treaty on the European Union), 67 where the
European Union sought to address the possibility of human rights
violations by countries with histories of corrupt governments and with
differing ideologies on democracy and the rule of law. 68 The European
Union could send a formal warning to a non-compliant member by
invoking Article 7(1). 69 By invoking Article 7(2), the European Union
relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens").
62. PLANA, supra note 42, at 51 ("The EU holds judicial independence and managerial
accountability to be the two fundamental conditions for obtaining membership.").
63. See, e.g., Boies, supra note 59, at 58 ("Judicial independence and judicial
supremacy work together in an attempt to guarantee that the rule of law will not be
eroded by the political pressures in existence at any particular point in time");
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Preamble, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 1 (The Union is founded on the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law" principles which are
common to the Member States) (emphasis added).
64. See generally Shetreet, supra note 2, at 276 (describing how international human
rights treaties value judicial independence because of its connection to fair court
procedure).
65. Ginger Hervey & Emmet Livingstone, What is Article 7?, POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2016,
10:55 AM), http://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-eu-news-article-7-vote-poland-rule-of
law/.
66. Id.
67. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 1.
68. Id. art. 1 (adding the text "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,
principles which are common to the Member States" to the amended Treaty on European
Union).
69. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 7, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 1, 7.
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could restrict the non-compliant state's voting rights, which limits its
direct influence on the decision-making of the European Union. 70
Though this possibility exists, Article 7 is a dormant law that has
never been invoked; thus, the feasibility of utilizing this sanctioning
method to encourage compliance with judicial independence standards
is questionable. 71 This is because Article 7 is a multi-step process that
involves thorough review of the offending country's actions with
conditions for sanctions that are hard to satisfy. 72 Further, the
"relatively open-ended nature" of EU provisions regarding the "rule of
law" make it difficult for the European Commission to take action
against non-compliant member states. 73 The European Union's focus on
threats to the rule of law of a "systemic nature" also creates a situation
where typically the member state brought up for Article 7 procedures
has substantially deviated from EU ideals. 74 This focus on retroactively
punishing member states for straying too far from the EU rule of law
principles permits member states to deviate to a point where returning
to compliance is time-consuming and intensive. Therefore, Article 7
procedures are not terribly effective in preventing threats to judicial
independence in the first place.
Article 7 sanctions are not the only ways that the European Union
could take action against non-compliant member states. For example,
the European Union could attach conditions to the aid it provides
countries that do not comply with standards of judicial independence.
The European Union has a seven-year financial framework that
provides funding for the advancement of member states. 75 States that do
not adhere to EU values could receive a lower allocation of funding,
while states that adhere closely could receive more financial
assistance. 76 This would be akin to economic punishment and could
encourage member states to closely follow EU law and policy. There are
some downsides to the European Union, however, if it were to take this
approach. The EU budget primarily supports "growth and jobs,"
especially in underdeveloped and disadvantaged populations, and
70. Id.

71. See Kochenov & Pech, supra not.e 44, at 3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 7.
75. See Budget, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/budget_en
(last visit.ed, Feb. 13, 2019).
76. See Overview MFF 2014-2020, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/
mff/index2014-2020_en.cfm (last visit.ed Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining how the MFF provides
a seven-year budget for the EU to advance specified initiatives, but the allocation of the
funds could vary over the course of the seven-year period due to built-in flexibility
mechanisms).
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"producing safe and secure food supplies, innovative farming and
efficient and sustainable use of land and forests." 77 Reducing this
funding, which is designed to assist the welfare of disadvantaged
populations, could have a significant impact on human rights, and so
the European Union may not wish to utilize this type of economic
sanctioning.
In Poland's case on July 26, 2017, the European Commission
launched "an infringement proceeding against Poland for breaches of
EU law." 78 In its press release, the commission threatened to "trigger
Article 7(1) procedure" and issued several recommendations for
revisions to recent reform efforts due to concerns about the "lack of an
independent and legitimate Constitutional review in Poland." 79 Poland
was given one month to address the European Commission's concerns
about the commission's desire to "pursue a constructive dialogue with
the Polish Government." 80 The press release made clear that if Poland
did not make substantial progress towards compliance with EU
standards of judicial independence, infringement proceedings would
continue. 81
Poland, however, did not change its course and instead solidified its
alliance with Hungary, another country under attack by the European
Union for its lack of adherence to the rule of law.82 On September 25,
2017, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, who previously vetoed
several of the controversial judicial reform bills, called for "further
'consultations' over potential changes to the constitution." 83 Poland
continued to waver in its commitment to maintaining judicial
independence; the PiS majority political party disagreed with politicians
like the president on what should be done in the face of potential EU
sanctions. As a result, the European Commission again found that
Poland had not made considerable progress and has since "moved to the
next stage of the infringement procedure."84 In this stage, the European
77. See Budget, supra note 75.
78. European Commission Press Release IP/17/2161, The European Commission Acts
to Preserve the Rule of Law in Poland (July 26, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press
release_lP-17-216l_en.htm.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id.

82. Lili Bayer, Poland and Hungary Stand United (Except on Russia), POLITICO (Sept.
23, 2017, 6:43 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-hungary-stand-united-except-on
russia-orban-szydlo/.
83. Polish President Urges Constitutional Change Amid Plans for Legal Reform, RADIO
POLAND (Sept. 25, 2017, 1:11 PM), http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/327351,Polish
president-urges-constitutional-change-amid-plans-for-legal -reform.
84. Hervey & Livingston, supra note 65.
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Commission again issued a notice to Poland urging the state to take
"appropriate measures" to address their concerns or the Commission
would refer the case to the Court of Justice of the EU.8 5 Thereafter, the
European Commission granted Poland another month to work towards
correcting infringements on articles on the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union
(TEU).86
The Polish government still did not comply with EU calls for
compliance. On December 20, 2017, the European Commission elevated
the infringement procedures as to the ordinary courts within Poland
and stated that there was a "clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of
law."87 On June 27, 2018, the EU General Affairs Council held a hearing
to consider the crisis in Poland. 88 The Polish government gave no
indication "of forthcoming measures to address the Commission's
outstanding concerns."89 Furthermore, the crisis in Poland worsened on
June 28, 2018, when the government executed a "sweeping purge of the
Supreme Court'' and forced retirement of twenty-seven justices,
including the top judge.90 The European Commission again invoked
infringement proceedings in line with Article 7(1) but this time
regarding actions taken against the Supreme Court by issuing a Letter
of Formal Notice on July 2, 2018.91 The European Commission gave
Poland one month to reply to the formal notice. Unsurprisingly, at a
follow up hearing with the General Affairs Council, the Polish
government held steadfast to its position.92 On September 24, 2018, the
commission referred Poland to the EU Court of Justice "due to its
violation of the principle of judicial independence."93
The infringement proceedings remain ongoing without a foreseeable
end in sight. Perhaps other enforcement methods of judicial
independence standards would be more effective either independently or
in conjunction with action taken by the European Union.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. European Commission Press Release IP/17/3186, The Commission, Independence
of the Judiciary: European Commission Takes Second Step in Infringement Procedure
against Poland (Sept. 12, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3186_en.htm.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Marc Santora, Poland Purges Supreme Court, and Protesters Take to Streets, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/europe/poland-supreme
court-protest.html?module=inline.
91. European Commission Press Release IP/18/4341, The Commission, Rule of Law:
Commission Launches Infringement Procedure to Protect the Independence of the Polish
Supreme Court (July 2, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-434l_en.htm.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The Role of Private Actors

As previously discussed, economic factors play a strong role in
encouraging judicial reform, and judicial independence plays a strong
role in maintaining a healthy economy. As such, economic measures can
effectively persuade governments to comply with international
standards, especially considering the essential relationship between
states and private actors such as international corporations. States rely
on international commerce to bolster their economic health, while
international businesses rely on state protection of judicial
independence for their long-term prosperity, which is closely linked to
the adjudication of their international disputes. 94 Because private actors
maintain a level of flexibility and freedom in their activities that
intergovernmental organizations do not possess, they may be best
positioned to engage in economic measures to enforce international
standards of judicial independence.
Economic development does not occur without investments by
businesses, many of which are international private actors. 95 These
private actors will not invest unless they have confidence that they will
turn a profit and that there is a low amount of risk. 96 Thus, factors such
as judicial independence can play a role in a private actor's decision to
invest in a country's economy. 97 This is because an independent
judiciary is essential to maintaining private property rights and because
private actors must rely on the judiciary to adjudicate their legal
disputes-the outcome of which influences the health of their
businesses. 98 Without judicial independence, private actors cannot be
sure that "courts do not favor politically powerful or connected parties in
contractual disputes" or that courts will not "always side with the
government." 99 Thus, private actors have a marked interest in ensuring
that judicial independence is maintained in regions where they have
made significant economic investments 100 and are unlikely to invest in
94. See Phillips, supra note 7, at 929 ("(Independent judiciaries] resolve commercial
disputes in a predictable and transparent fashion that encourages fair competition and
economic growth").
95. Klerman, supra note 7, at 428.
96. See id. (describing how "[i]n most developed countries, constitutional guarantees
and powerful courts reduce the risk of expropriation," and so this would be an
environment w here investments would occur).
97. See generally Feld & Voigt, supra note 32, at 516 (showing a positive link between
the presence of judicial independence and gains in countries' overall GDP through a study
of 57 countries).
98. Id.
99. Klerman, supra note 7, at 428.

100. Id.
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countries where judicial independence is threatened. 101
Recent scholarship has noted the importance of judicial
independence in a country's economic health, which supports the notion
that countries must evaluate economic risk when making decisions
about judicial structure.102 Because private actors invest in countries
where they can rely on judicial independence for the fair adjudication of
their disputes, countries must maintain judicial independence for the
betterment of their economy by private actors.103 Where one party fails
to uphold their side of this relationship, both parties feel the economic
consequences.104 Private actors thus have an incentive to encourage
states to move toward compliance with international standards of
judicial independence.105
Private actors may advocate for judicial reform in a few ways. For
example, on a basic level, a private actor may cause direct economic
consequences by simply withdrawing its business from countries that do
not maintain judicial independence.106 Whereas intergovernmental
organizations like the European Union must carefully consider the
impact of withdrawal of funds from member states, private actors
maintain a higher level of freedom and can make decisions solely based
on the health of their business. This impact on the promotion of the
independent judiciary would be felt more significantly if private actors
banded together and directly communicated a message of disapproval
against countries that did not uphold standards of judicial
independence. The counterpoint to this approach would be that
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Shetreet, supra note 34, at 14; see also Phillips, supra note 7, at 918
(discussing judicial reform and judicial independence as essential to the development of
countries such as Poland); Klerman, supra note 7, at 434 (describing judicial independence
as essential to the economic health of a country).
103. Klerman, supra note 7, at 428.
104. When judicial independence is absent, private investors are not likely to invest in
the country's economy. Private actors that already have investments may suffer financial
losses where judiciaries that adjudicate their disputes are not independent and impartial
because the judiciary may by default hold in favor of the government or the interests of
the dominant political party. The country, in turn, faces economic backlash when
investors withdraw due to fears of lost profits and financial insecurity. See Klerman,
supra note 7, at 428 (depicting the economic theory behind judicial independence's
encouragement of investment by private actors and how countries must maintain judicial
independence to avoid economic consequences).
105. See Phillips, supra note 7, at 920 (explaining the role of private actors in shaping
judicial reform through the expenditure of "loans, grants, and technical expertise,
international organizations, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and private
consultants").
106. See generally Stephan, supra note 18, at 1584-85 (describing the recent increase of
upstream international lawmaking by private actors who utilize economic means as ways
to shape the law in favor of effective global business transactions).
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attacking the economy of a country could eventually have an impact on
the state of human rights through the loss of jobs and overall decrease
in profit by the people living there. This impact on human rights,
however, would perhaps be less extreme than if the European Union
were to withdraw its funding that directly assists vulnerable
communities whom are already at risk.
Private actors concerned about directly cutting ties with non
compliant countries could instead make investments into organizations,
such as CEELI, that promote judicial independence in areas without a
strong tradition of independent judiciaries. These positive investments
may have a higher correlation in encouraging the protection of judicial
independence as both send a direct message in support of judicial
independence and support organizations actively working to promote it.
There is a strong history of private actors effectively shaping the
promulgation of the rule of law, especially in central and eastern
Europe.107 This export of the rule of law to private entities is fairly
harmless as long as it can be assured that these private actors do not
inappropriately use these investments for their own gain (such as
engaging in corruption or conduct such as bribery). 108 If private actors
contain their financial investments to NGOs that have proven to
support judicial reform, this could be an effective way of promulgating
adherence to judicial independence standards.
In the case of Poland, threats to judicial independence have already
created concern that Poland would face future economic difficulty. In an
interview with Bloomberg News in Brussels, Principal Vice President
Frans Timmermans of the European Commission noted that the "attack
on judicial independence has given foreign investors jitters about the
credibility of the Polish legal system." 109 Timmermans asserted that the
threat to judicial independence was "a business issue" and that
investors would worry about the "security of [their] investments." 110
Thus, an opportunity exists for private actors to openly decry the Polish
government's actions in limiting judicial independence. This open
107. See, e.g., Phillips, supra not;e 7, at 928 (discussing the promotion of judicial
independence through Central and East;ern Europe, driven by the funding of privat;e
actors).
108. See id. at 932 (describing the pitfalls of privat;e investment in judicial reform as the
judiciary becoming beholden to private entities rather than political parties, but also
discounting this theory as a shortcoming of the poor planning of the executed judicial
independence reforms in question).
109. Jonathan Stearns, Ewa Krukowska & Nikos Chrysoloras, Poland's Authoritarian
Shift Spurs Warning of Economic Trouble, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 7-09-17/poland-s-authoritarian-shiftsspurs
warning-of-economic-trouble.
110. Id.
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condemnation of threats to judicial independence, especially when
coupled with either economic threats or investments in NGOs dedicated
to the promulgation of judicial independence, could be the influence
Poland needs to return to compliance. While there are indications that
pressure from the European Union may slowly convince Poland to
change its course, immediate threats to the country's economy may
cause quicker action (whereas action by the European Union could take
several months due to the need for recommendations and court
proceedings before the institution of sanctions).
ill. CREATING A MODEL FOR THE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
As discussed, both intergovernmental and private actors recognize
the importance of judicial independence. Therefore, the best model for
the effective regulation of international standards of judicial
independence in Europe would involve the cooperation by the European
Union and private actors with economic interests in the region.
This model would involve the promulgation of concrete standards of
judicial independence much like the Mount Scopus International
Standards of Judicial Independence that have a larger focus on
establishing organizational safeguards. These standards could contain
provisions that state (but are of course not limited to) that the executive
and legislature should not be allowed power to overturn judicial
decisions, that compensation for judges should be adequate and fixed,
and that judicial disciplinary committees must be independent bodies
not subject to excessive oversight by the other branches of government.
Importantly, new standards would focus equally on the underlying
ideals that support the notion of judicial independence (such as the
right to a fair trial) and on ways that countries can draft constitutions
and formulate governmental structures that ensure judicial
independence is protected.
With more well-defined and stricter international standards of
judicial independence, it would be more difficult for EU member states
to deviate from standards in the future. However, in the event of non
compliance, private actors who are not tied to the administrative
bureaucracy of international government organizations could act as the
enforcers of these standards by utilizing economic punishment and
incentives. When countries deviate from standards of judicial
independence as outlined by the European Union, private actors can
band together to withdraw their business from offending countries.
Private actors can also collectively organize, contribute to organizations
that promote judicial independence, and publicly comment about their
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decision to avoid business in countries where judicial independence is
threatened. This economic and social commentary, in combination with
official efforts by the European Union, could add needed pressure to
ensure that countries return to compliance. In this way, judicial
independence could be better protected by recognizing the interests of
both intergovernmental and private actors and ensuring the protection
of both economic and human rights.
That said, the influence of private actors who are driven by
economic interests works best when curbed by intergovernmental
organizations who are more in tune with the needs of human rights
initiatives. An effective model would avoid leaving too much discretion
to private actors in the entirety of enforcement decisions as they may be
persuaded to act with only their best economic interests in mind versus
the public's need to have their rights secured. 111 Primarily, the
standards need to be drafted and shaped by the European Union, as
their mission is to represent the needs of all people in Europe, not just
corporations. With clear, unbiased objectives defined by the European
Union, private actors would have clear guidelines of what constituted
acceptable and unacceptable behavior on the part of EU member
countries.
A balance must be struck to ensure the proper enforcement of
standards of judicial independence without bias as to the country's
economic standing or potential. For example, private actors may take
into consideration the profitability of the market in question. Applying a
cost-benefit analysis, a private actor could determine that potential
unfair treatment in disputes in a country with low judicial
independence is worth the risk due to the high potential for economic
gain in the region and the monetary loss it would sustain by
withdrawing its business. Moreover, it is possible that corruption could
occur; private actors' economic threats could then make judiciaries too
sympathetic when adjudicating private actors' disputes due to a
pressure to retain their business in the country.
Thus, careful regulation by the European Union must occur to
ensure that enforcement of standards of judicial independence is done
fairly and equally among member states. The European Union could
offer incentives for private actors to enforce judicial independence
standards by enacting policy-perhaps conferring trade benefits for
private actors that restrict their business to compliant member states.
Thus, if the European Union were to adopt more specific and concrete
111. See Stephan, supra note 18, at 1619-23 (describing how law created for and by
private actors leads to effective lawmaking for those parties, but that, in areas where
human rights are involved, the cooperation of the state leads to more optimal results for
all involved).
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standards of judicial independence, it could incentivize private actors to
utilize them to identify and openly support countries where judicial
independence is actively fostered while foregoing business where it is
weak.
If a balance can be found, the needs of intergovernmental
organizations, private actors with economic interests, and the people
who reside in countries where judicial independence is at threat can all
be met. With the combined influence of the European Union, who
provides substantial benefit in terms of social welfare, and private
actors, who provide support to the economy, non-compliant countries
can be persuaded to return to compliance. In the absence of both the
European Union and the investments of private actors, a country like
Poland would surely suffer. So, by leveraging the influence of both
parties in a combined effort, Poland may conform to EU values and
ideals as proscribed by EU law.
CONCLUSION

With threats to the independence of Poland's judiciary, there is
clearly a need for cooperation between the European Union and private
actors with investments in the region. While the European Union can
provide the necessary law, values, and structure to mandate that an
independent judiciary be present in its member states, its enforcement
proceedings for non-compliance can be lengthy and overly bureaucratic.
Overall, non-compliant member states may not feel a sense of urgency
when faced with threats of Article 7 procedures, especially absent a
history of these sanctions ever being utilized. Private actors, on th�
other hand, are not tied down by diplomatic concerns and can act in line
with their economic interests, which are greatly influenced by a lack of
judicial independence. Private actors can have a significant impact on
the promotion of judicial independence in a country like Poland by
utilizing both economic threats and investments in NGOs that
promulgate judicial independence. The weight of sanctioning by the
European Union can effectively be combined with direct and more
immediate economic consequences by private actors.
Judicial independence is a core value of proper governance and
ensures that all parties, no matter their social status or political
identity, receive due process and a fair day in court. Thus, it is in the
interest of the European Union not only to create or adopt a more well
defined set of standards to ensure that judicial independence is
protected internationally but also to encourage enforcement
mechanisms that effectively encourage non-compliant member states to
adhere with standards. With the careful oversight of intergovernmental
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bodies, private actors can effectively advocate for judicial reform that
both meets their economic interests and the human rights needs of the
European people.

